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The intent of the patent system is to encourage innovation by granting the innovator exclusive rights
to a discovery for a limited period of time: with monopoly power, the innovator can recover the costs of
creating the innovation which otherwise might not have existed. And, over time, the resulting innovation
makes everyone better off. This presumption of improved social welfare is considered here. The paper
examines the impact of patents on welfare in an environment where there are large numbers of (small)
innovators. With patents, because there is monopoly for a limited time the outcome is necessarily not
socially optimal, although social welfare may be higher than in the no-patent state. Patent acquisition
and ownership createstwo opposing incentives at the same time: the incentive to acquiremonopoly rights
conferred by the patent spurs innovation, but subsequent ownership of those rights inhibits innovation
(both own innovation and that of others). On balance, which effect will dominate? In the framework of
this paper separate circumstances are identiﬁed under which patents are either beneﬁcial or detrimental
to innovation and welfare; and comparisons are drawn with the socially optimal level of investment in
innovation.1 Introduction.
Conventional wisdom holds that the granting of the right of exclusive use of a discovery for a limited period
of time encourages innovation, and the value of this in the long run outweighs the inefﬁciencies associated
with temporary monopoly power over the discovery. This reasoning provides a primary justiﬁcation for
the patent system and the protection of intellectual property. Yet, despite the fact that the patent system
has been in operation for hundreds of years, this basic view is still the subject of ongoing debate.
This comparison of costs due to monopoly relative to the beneﬁt of increased innovation abstracts from
many other incentives arising from the rights granted by a patent and which may affect the efﬁcacy of
the patent system. While the problem of monopoly is well understood, there are many ways in which the
assignment of monopoly rights through a patent generate unforeseen consequences. For example, overlap
of patent rights to technologies combined in a product may create “holdup” problems where individual
patents holders can make competing demands; or rent-seeking behavior may arise where a patent holder
seeks to extract revenue from a competitor through rights claims and the threat of litigation; or unde-
served patents may be issued, and so on. Such issues have attracted considerable attention recently, but
will not be examined here.
The focus of this paper is on comparison of the beneﬁt to increased incentive to innovate and acquire
patent rights against the attendant monopoly costs in an “ideal world” where the system functions per-
fectly, identiﬁes all true innovations, rejects all false claims and operates in a manner that completely
eliminates any abuse, manipulation, or gaming of the system. Of course, in practice such issues of abuse
and operational weakness limit the efﬁcacy of the patent system, imposing additional operating burdens.
So, as a benchmark, consideration of the value of the system in the theoretically ideal environment pro-
vides a best case scenario benchmark. In subsequent paragraphs some historical context is given followed
by a brief outline of the paper and summary of the main results.
From a historical perspective, these considerations (of conﬂict between monopoly rights and the incen-
tive to innovate) have been present since patents were ﬁrst issued in the late Middle Ages. In England,
Edward III granted a patent for Woollen weaving in 1331 to John Kempe of Flanders; Henry VI granted
a patent for the manufacture of colored glass in 1449. At this time, one major purpose in issuing patents
was to stimulate growth of new manufacturing;1 but the potential for patents to encourage innovation was
also understood. The Venetian Senate voted a patent law governing all classes of invention into existence
in 1474, giving patent protection for 10 years, with free access to the government. According to the pream-
ble to the law [5]: “We have among us men of great genius, apt to invent and discover ingenious devices...
Now, if provisions were made for the works and devices discovered by such persons, so that others who
may see them could not build them and take the inventor’s honor [sic] away, more men would then apply
1Henry VI granted a stained glass making patent to a glass maker from Flanders, John of Utynam, with a view to developing
glass making in England. In this case, the purpose of the patent was to encourage local development of a known procedure.
1their genius, would discover, and would build devices of great utility to our commonwealth.”
Thus, by the end of the Middle Ages, at least, the use of patents to encourage the creation of new
inventions and discoveries and to promote general welfare was recognized. In the New World, patents
were granted by colonial governments. Massachusetts granted a patent for a new way of making salt
in 1641. That year the colonial legislature of Massachusetts enacted a law asserting that no monopolies
(exclusive rights) would be granted [10], with the exception of new inventions “proﬁtable to the country,
and that for a short time.” The ﬁrst American patent was granted in 1790, and the ﬁrst French patent in
1791. By the late 1800’s, most European countries had patent laws in place. The importance attached to
patents in the United States can be seen from the fact that the ﬁrst ones issued were signed by George
Washington, Thomas Jefferson and Edmund Randolph (the ﬁrst Attorney General). Article 1, section 8
of the United States Constitution (ratiﬁed in 1788) gave Congress the power “To promote the progress
of science and useful arts, by securing for limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive right to
their respective writings and discoveries.” After some chaos in developing procedures, the Patent Act of
1836 established the Patent Ofﬁce as a separate bureau of the State Department, later (1926) to become
a bureau of the Commerce Department. See [12] for a broad review of the history and patent literature to
the present.
Still, concerns regarding the balance between granting monopoly power and protecting societal welfare
were present, even from the earliest days in the United States. At the time of drafting the constitution,
Jefferson expressed concern to Madison in a letter dated July 31, 1788 [14]:
“...... The saying there shall be no monopolies lessens the incitements to ingenuity, which is
spurred on by the hope of a monopoly for a limited time, as of 14 years; but the beneﬁt even of
limited monopolies is too doubtful to be opposed to that of their general suppression.”
Madison replied:
“With regard to monopolies they are justly classed among the greatest nuisances in govern-
ment. But is it clear that as encouragements to literary works and ingenious discoveries, they
are not too valuable to be wholly renounced? Would it not sufﬁce to reserve in all cases a right
to the public to abolish the privilege at a price to be speciﬁed in the grant of it? Is there not
also inﬁnitely less danger of this abuse in our governments than in most others? Monopolies
are sacriﬁces of the many to the few. Where the power is in the few it is natural for them to
sacriﬁce the many to their own partialities and corruptions. Where the power, as with us, is in
the many not in the few, the danger can not be very great that the few will be thus favored. It
is much more to be dreaded that the few will be unnecessarily sacriﬁced to the many.”
Thus, careful reﬂection led to an equivocal view of patents involving an inseparable mixture of good and
2bad — with the belief that patents sped up the rate of innovation and the beneﬁts from this outweighed
the monopoly cost associated with the creation of temporary monopoly.
Putting aside questions of abuse, inefﬁcient operation and so on, many consider the basic presumption
of net beneﬁt a largely unproven belief. In the area of medical research the assessment of the value of
patent protection is mixed (see [13], [6], and the references cited therein.) Concerning software patents,
Bessen and Hunt [2] conclude that in the software industry there appears to be little correlation between
the rate at which ﬁrms invest in R&D and the rate of innovation. A recent and broad ranging critique
of the patent system, and the notion of intellectual property more generally is given in [4]. In fact, from
a variety of perspectives, one might argue that patent protection slows innovation. One such view sees
competition as the key force behind innovation [11]: innovators gain market share, so the need to survive
places continuous pressure on ﬁrms to innovate. In this Schumpeterian view, it is the absence of protection
that drives ﬁrms to innovate.
The impact of patents may depend substantially on the ﬁeld of application: Bessen and Hunt identify
the chemical industry as one where patents may be important in the decision to conduct R&D. Thus the
balance of costs and beneﬁts is still the subject of intense debate; and the intent of this paper is to address
this matter, comparing the beneﬁt from spurred invention against the temporary monopoly costs incurred.
The impact of patents in advanced industries (such as software and semiconductors) has been studied
by Bessen and Maskin [3] who consider environments where innovation is sequential and complementary
— successive innovation builds on what has gone before in a sequential way and innovation is complemen-
tary in the sense that the probability of success in discovery is improved when more ﬁrms pursue research.
Different innovators follow different routes of research. In this setting, in certain circumstances, patents
can actually inhibit innovation by limiting imitation that spurs the development of further innovation.
They focus on the case where there are a small number of competing innovators. In contrast, here the
environment is one with a large population.
While the use of (voluntary) licensing potentially permits broad application of new discovery imme-
diately, this depends on the feasibility of such agreements. One may even appeal to the Coase theorem
to assert that where gains are possible, licensing agreements will be reached. However, in practice, with
a multiplicity of “players”, unclear ownership rights or unclear breadth of patent; with the potential use
of hold-up tactics to extract rents, the complexity, time and expense of legal resolution, and so forth, the
expectation of a Coase-style resolution may be wishful thinking. The study of such issues will not be
taken up here. This paper considers the question of whether the welfare cost from temporary monopoly is
greater or less than the welfare gains from increased innovation spurred by the monopoly rights granted
by patents. And, in examining this tradeoff, the research here is exclusively concerned with the impact of
patents in an ideal world where the complications just mentioned are absent.
An outline of the paper is as follows. Section 2 develops the model. In the framework developed here
3a ﬁrm may have monopoly power in the sense that it has ownership over some component of the total
technology set, and can limit use of this particular innovation by others. A patent gives the holder the
right to exclusive use of the owned component. Firms have two choice variables, the current decision and
an investment decision to improve its future technology. The current decision variable is subsumed in a
proﬁt function, only the ﬁrm’s investment decision is considered. Section 3 considers the consequences of
changing patent length and highlights the impact of access to the innovation of others on the marginal
product of investment and the manner in which such knowledge correlates with a ﬁrms’ own technology
in terms of payoff impact. Depending on these features, patents may either reduce or raise social welfare
(although they never lead to the socially optimal level of innovation). The welfare implications of the
patent system in this environment are considered in detail in section 4. When the primary users of inno-
vations entering the public domain after patent expiry are ﬁrms that are relatively weak technologically,
then lengthening the patent period forces weaker ﬁrms to invest and create their own technology. This
in turn puts pressure on better ﬁrms to stay ahead with increased investment and the overall effect is to
raise social welfare. When these effects are not present, the case for patents is weaker or non-existent.
Section 5.1 brieﬂy discusses a variety of issues not considered in the paper, section 6 concludes.
2 The Model.
The environment is characterized by a collection of many competing ﬁrms. Firms are differentiated by
their own technology and proﬁtability depends on this and aggregate variables. We assume that ﬁrms
protect own technology improvements through patenting, so that only the technology of a ﬁrm that is
beyond the patent life is available for use by competitors. Only legitimate innovations are patented,
and all such innovations are patented. Patent holders do not license innovations but exploit them as
monopolists until patent expiry. These assumptions abstract from many important issues surrounding the
issuance and acquisition of patents, some of which are discussed further in section 5.1. In this framework,
the merits of patenting stand or fall on whether or not monopoly for a limited period of time has the
overall effect of encouraging innovation, relative to the no-patent environment. Of course, because the
market does not internalize fully the beneﬁts of innovation there is scope for welfare improvement through
incentives to encourage innovation.
2.1 The Model: Main Features
The technology of each ﬁrm evolves over time. At any point in time, a ﬁrm has its own technology, has
access to technologies that are in the public domain, and makes investment decisions that affect its future
technology. Aggregating individual behavior gives the aggregate distribution over technology and invest-
ment, and determines the evolution of the aggregate distribution of technologies over time. These details
4are described next.
2.1.1 Technology.
A ﬁrm is characterized by its technology α∈ A, where A is the set of all possible technologies. To allow for
the possibility that one ﬁrm may be better than another in some respects, and worse in others, technology
is multidimensional. Reﬂecting this, and to permit comparison of different ﬁrms technologies, take A to
be an ordered space, with order   (see the appendix for discussion). This formulation permits a large set







Example 1 Figure 1 illustrates the case where a ﬁrm’s technology is characterized by a function
α, attaching a quality η to each feature z. Each feature is indexed as a real number in some range,
z∈[0, ¯ z], and quality, η, a real non-negative number. Comparing technologies (or ﬁrms) α and α′, tech-
nology α′ is superior on low and high indexed features while technology α is superior on mid-ranged
features. Two technologies are comparable if α   α′ or if α′   α. If α   α′ then α is unequivocally a
better ﬁrm than α′ in every way; but in general technologies may not be comparable (neither α α′ or
α′   α). In the ﬁgure, if we order the functions according the rule, α′   α if and only if α′(z)≥ α(z) for
all z, then in this example, neither α α′ or α′  α, whereas α  ¯ α. ♦
The distribution of technologies in the market is denoted  , or  t to denote the distribution of tech-
nologies at time t: a probability measure on A.2 There are a continuum of ﬁrms. This implies that each
ﬁrm is negligible and eliminates strategic considerations from the model.3,4
2Assume that the measure has no atoms: each ﬁrm has probability or measure 0, so that no ﬁrm has strategic market power.
3See section 5.1 for a brief discussion of some of these issues.
4Furthermore, since the model is concerned with the dynamics of investment over time, this assumption makes state variables
independent of individual behavior and simpliﬁes the computations.
5If α and α′ are in the support of  t, they represent two technologies in operation at time t. Let
µt ={ τ}−∞
τ=t =(..., t−1, t)=(..., t−ℓ−1 ; t−ℓ, t−ℓ+1... t)
denote the sequence of past technology distributions over time. With patent length ℓ (the length for which
a patent is granted), technologies { t−ℓ−j}j≥0 are available for public use at time t: any technology in the
support of  t−ℓ−j may be used by a ﬁrm, and apart from technology α, only technologies in the support of
distribution  t−ℓ or older may be used by ﬁrm α. Finally, in considering market efﬁciency, it is necessary
to compare the quality of technology distributions — throughout the paper technology distributions are
compared in terms of ﬁrst order stochastic dominance.5,6
2.1.2 The Firm
Firms are deﬁned in terms of their proﬁt functions. The proﬁt of a ﬁrm at time t depends on its technology
α, current competition represented by the distribution of prevailing technologies,  t, and technologies
in the public domain,  t−ℓ, π( t, t−ℓ,α). This may be written alternatively as π(µt,α,ℓ) to highlight
the length of technology protection ℓ.7,8 Finally, over time ﬁrms invest from proﬁt to improve future
technology: the level of investment i costs r(i), where r is assumed to satisfy r′ ≥ 0 and r′′ ≥ 0. With
investment level i, the ﬁrm’s current net revenue is π( t, t−ℓ,α)−r(i).
Example 2 Let a market have demand given at time t by Pd(Q, t) and suppose that  ′
t   t implies
Pd(Q, ′
t) ≥ Pd(Q, t), so that better technology raises demand. Suppose also that ﬁrm α has cost
given by 1
2c(α, t−ℓ)q2. Assume that for any ( t−ℓ,α), c(α, t−ℓ) ≥ c(α′, t−ℓ) if α′   α and c(α, ′
t−ℓ) ≤
c(α, t−ℓ) if  ′
t−ℓ    t−ℓ. Therefore, ﬁrm α’s proﬁt is given by maxq Pd(Q, t)q− 1
2c(α, t−ℓ)q2. The
solution to this has Pd(Q, t) − c(α, t−ℓ)q = 0, determining q: q(α) =
Pd(Q, t)
c(α, t−ℓ), and aggregate is
Q =
R
q(α) t(dα) = P
R 1
c(α, t−ℓ) t(dα), giving inverse supply curve Ps(Q, t, t−ℓ) = Q 1 R 1
c(α, t−ℓ) t(dα).
To simplify, let ϕ(α) be a quality-efﬁciency index of technology α. Suppose that cost is given by
c(α, t−ℓ) = [ϕ(α)g( t−ℓ)]−1 where ϕ and g are increasing in α and  t−ℓ respectively. Finally, set
f( )=
R













Q = f( t)2Q−βg( t−ℓ)






6Note that “ ” is an ordering on technologies, Λ, whereas “ ” is an ordering on distributions over technologies P (Λ). See the
appendix for further discussion.
7If the patent length, ℓ, lies between two periods, τ and τ−1, interpolate between the two periods: for example, let (ℓ−[τ−
1]) τ +(τ−ℓ) τ−1 be the most recent publicly available technology, so that the patent length can be treated as a non-negative real
number.
8In fact we may let π depend on the entire sequence  t, t−1,... so that in principle recent technical developments affect current
proﬁt.




1+β so that the equilibrium price is:










Proﬁt of α is














































In this context, improvements in technology have three effects: demand rises, cost decreases as all
ﬁrms avail of technology improvements; and each ﬁrm becomes more efﬁcient as advances in technol-
ogy raise the ﬁrms ability to make technology improvements. The ﬁrst effect unambiguously beneﬁts
all ﬁrms, the second effect increases both a ﬁrm’s ability to compete and the competitiveness of its
competitors. If the overall net effect is to raise a ﬁrm’s proﬁt, say that proﬁt improves with aggregate
technology. ♦
Deﬁnition 1 Proﬁt increases with technology improvement if π(µt,α,ℓ) is increasing in µt.
The proﬁt function in example 2 satisﬁes this condition provided β<1. Later, it is assumed that proﬁt does
increase with technological improvement. This assumption is not innocuous since, as mentioned, there
are conﬂicting effects: while technological improvements may raise demand and lower the cost structure
of a ﬁrm — thus tending to raise proﬁt, they also strengthen competition between ﬁrms which works in
the opposite direction.
2.1.3 The Evolution of Technology
A ﬁrm may invest each period in research and technological improvement. Technological improvement is
represented by a transition kernel, P(d ˜ α|µt,α,i,ℓ), where i is investment. This formulation covers many
7possibilities: for example, if only technology available at the patent date is relevant, then the transition
kernel may be written as P(d ˜ α| t−ℓ,α,i) — a ﬁrm with technology α may use investment and the knowl-
edge of technologies in the support of  t−ℓ to develop its technology next period. The formulation allows
for the possibility that a ﬁrm may require investment to achieve the standards represented by  t−ℓ — it
may not be possible for a ﬁrm to effortlessly implement the best technologies in the support of  t−ℓ. At
the other extreme, it may be possible for the ﬁrm to costlessly implement any technology in the support
of  t−ℓ. A ﬁrm owns it technology, no licensing of technology occurs. Obviously, licensing introduces new
possibilities for a ﬁrm to improve its technology and could potentially mitigate some of the monopoly cre-
ating aspects of a patent. However, the intent here is to study the merits of patenting on the primary
comparison of an enhanced rate of innovation against the creation of temporary monopoly power.
Example 3 One simple way to model the transition kernel is to have it be a weighted average of two
distributions. Let F and G be two distributions on Λ with F   G, and let ρ(µ,α,i,ℓ) ∈ [0,1]. Deﬁne
the transition kernel:
P(d ˜ α|µt,α,i,ℓ) =ρ(µ,α,i,ℓ)F(d ˜ α)+[1−ρ(µ,α,i,ℓ)]G(d ˜ α) (1)
♦
Throughout the discussion some basic assumptions on technology are maintained. In particular, hav-
ing a better technology or investing more raises the probability of drawing a better technology, while
having less access to technology (through longer patent life) lowers the probability of drawing a good
technology. Formally, P(d ˜ α | µt,α,i,ℓ) is weakly increasing in α, and i; and weakly decreasing in ℓ (in
terms of ﬁrst order stochastic dominance).9 This latter assumption captures the impact of patent length
on the ﬁrm’s ability to innovate. Furthermore, P(d ˜ α | µt,α,i,ℓ) is increasing in µt — in the sense that if
µ′
t dominates µt coordinate-wise, written µ′
t   µt, then other things equal, a better distribution is drawn
conditional on µ′
t than µt. Better current technology and better technology in the public domain improves
the ﬁrms success in innovation. Finally, a ﬁrm’s technology cannot dis-improve over time: if drawing α′ is
possible for α, then α′   α.10,11
The investment strategies of ﬁrms in conjunction with the transition kernel, P, move the state of
the system forward over time. Firms investment strategies are represented by a joint distribution, τ, on
(i,α) ∈ I ×A, written τ∈ M(I ×A). Conditioning on α, τ(di |α), gives the distribution over investment of
ﬁrm α. Given the extant distribution over technologies is  , for consistency, if τ ∈ M(I ×A) the marginal
distribution of τ on A should coincide with  : margA τ =  . Let C ( ) = {τ | margAτ =  }, the set of
9For example, α′  α implies ﬁrst order stochastic dominance: P(d ˜ α| µt,α′,i,ℓ)  P(d ˜ α|µt,α,i,ℓ).
10If α′ ∈suppP( | µ,α,i,ℓ), then α′  α, where given a measure υ on Λ, suppυ is the support of υ.
11If P(d ˜ α| µt,α,i,ℓ) has support {α} when i =0, then the ﬁrm cannot improve without investment. Next period, without invest-
ment, the ﬁrm can avail of technologies in  t−ℓ+1.








So, given the current distribution on technologies,  t, if αt invests according to the strategy τt( |αt), then
next period the aggregate distribution on technologies is given by  t+1. If we ﬁx a sequence of strategies
τt ={τt+j( |αt+j)}j≥0, given  t, we may determine the sequence of distributions:
 t+1( )=ψ1( | t,τt,ℓ) = ψ( |µt,τt,ℓ) (3)
 t+2( )=ψ2( | t,τt,ℓ) = ψ( |(µt,ψ1( | t,τt,ℓ)),τt+1,ℓ) (4)
and so on. (See the appendix for some additional discussion.)12
2.2 Investment Decisions.
Over time, ﬁrms make period by period decisions on production, and in addition, make investment deci-
sions to develop future technology. The current production decision arises in the period by period market
equilibrium and determines current proﬁt, π. The investment decision generates current cost but im-
proves the competitive position of the ﬁrm in subsequent periods. For some of the discussion, it is useful
to write the present value at time t of the payoff ﬂow to a ﬁrm, α, optimizing in each period from this point
on — given the distribution up to the present, µt, and a sequence of aggregate distributions τt ={τs}∞
s=t as





v(µt+1,τt+1, ˜ α,ℓ)P(d ˜ α|µt,α,i,ℓ)} (5)
where µt+1 =(µt, t+1) with  t+1 given by equation (3). The function v is increasing in α: a ﬁrm with higher
α can imitate the investment strategy of one with lower α but enjoy lower cost and stochastically better
technology draws. Note that the positive externality from investment does not appear in the individual
ﬁrm’s investment decision, equilibrium is inefﬁcient. These observations are clariﬁed in the following
calculations.








v(µt+1,τt+1, ˜ α,ℓ)[P(d ˜ α|µt,α,i
′,ℓ)−P(d ˜ α|µt,α,i,ℓ)] =0
12In this environment, improvement in technology overall results from the ﬂow of individual discoveries — with each individual
discovery insigniﬁcant relative to the overall volume of discovery. One possible extension of this model is to allow for “paradigm
shift” discoveries which revolutionize an industry — in the way, for example, that the Mosaic web browser revolutionized internet
use. The formulation used here can accommodate such an extension provided that big breakthroughs are unanticipated. In such
a formulation, there is positive probability of a breakthrough discovery in any period (some ﬁrm will have a major discovery or
development), but no single ﬁrm can guarantee that it will have such a discovery with positive probability. In this case, revolutionary
innovations are unanticipated and hence don’t directly affect the investment incentives of ﬁrms.




v(µt+1,τt+1, ˜ α,ℓ)∆iP( ˜ α|µt,α,i,ℓ) =0. (6)




v(µt+1,τt+1, ˜ α,ℓ)∆iiP(d ˜ α|µt,α,i,ℓ) <0. (7)
Considering equation (6), since v is increasing in ˜ α and P in α (in ﬁrst order stochastic dominance terms),
the optimal value of i increases in α. A sequence of strategies ¯ τt ={¯ τt+j( |αt+j)}j≥0 is an equilibrium if for
any t, for each j ≥0, ¯ τt+j⊗ t+j has support {(it(α),α) |α∈ A}, where it(α) solves (6) at ¯ τt. Establishing the
existence of equilibrium is straightforward using arguments from [1] or [8].
Efﬁciency. In any equilibrium, the level of investment is inefﬁcient because there are positive external-
ities from investment. Consider the aggregate expected payoff:
Z




r(i)τt(di | dα) t(dα)
+δ
Z
v(µt,ψ1,τt+1, ˜ α,ℓ)P(d ˜ α|µt,α,i,ℓ)τt(di | dα) t(dα)}.
Perturbing τt(di | dα) in the direction ˜ τt to τt(di | dα)+ǫ∆τt(di | dα), ∆τt(di | dα) = ˜ τt−τt, and considering






v(µt,ψ1,τt+1, ˜ α,ℓ)P(d ˜ α|µt,α,i,ℓ)
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v(µt, ˜ ψ1,τt+1, ˜ α,ℓ)−v(µt,ψ1,τt+1, ˜ α,ℓ)
¤
P(d ˜ α|µt,α,i,ℓ)τt(di | dα) t(dα)
where ˜ ψ1 is the t+1 period distribution given the strategy τt(di | dα)+ǫ∆τt(di | dα) at time t. At the
market equilibrium, the ﬁrst term is approximately 0, but the second term is non-zero and captures the
(positive) externalities from improving the aggregate distribution.
In example 2, these externalities arise from two considerations. Improving the aggregate distribution
improves the knowledge base that individual ﬁrms can use, and therefore raises their investment success.
Second, improvement in technology improves demand, so that, in that environment the sum of producer
and consumer surplus increases in each period. This implies,
Theorem 1 In equilibrium, investment is below the efﬁcient level, since the positive externalities of invest-
ment through improved technology distributions are not internalized.
13Assume that 1
i′−i[P(d ˜ α|µt,α,i′,ℓ)−P(d ˜ α| µt,α,i,ℓ)] converges weakly to a signed measure ∆iP(d ˜ α|µt,α,i,ℓ) as i′ → i.





[∆iP(B |µt,α,i′,ℓ)−∆iP(B | µt,α,i,ℓ)] converges weakly to a signed measure,
∆iiP( | µt,α,i,ℓ), as i′ → i.
103 The Impact of Patent Length on Investment.
The effect of lengthening patent life is to reduce the publicly available technology. What is the impact of
such a change on welfare? Because the socially optimal level of investment is higher than that arising
in competitive equilibrium, whether lengthening patent length is beneﬁcial or not depends on the impact
such changes have on investment. The results to follow identify two cases.
When low technology ﬁrms are more dependent than high technology ﬁrms on the use of technology
protected by patent, then, subject to conditions, the impact of lengthening patent life is to force those ﬁrms
to greater research effort (by depriving them of access to previously unrestricted technology.) And this has
a knock-on effect of increasing the competitive pressure on good ﬁrms, forcing them to also raise invest-
ment. As a result, overall investment in R&D increases and this raises social welfare. Put differently,
technically weak ﬁrms are making greater use of publicly available technology: old technology is a sub-
stitute for investment. Reducing access to older technology forces those ﬁrms to invest. In the following
discussion, this is described as the “substitutes” case.
In the second case, low technology ﬁrms make relatively less use of technology beyond the patent pe-
riod: they are less dependent on public technology. Then, lengthening the patent period has relatively
greater impact on better technology ﬁrms. To the extent that patented technology is used, lengthening
patent length reduces the beneﬁts from and incentives to being “good” (relatively more than in the sub-
titutes case). Call this case the complements case, since good technology is complemented by knowledge
outside the patent period than is poor technology. In this case the overall impact is to lower social welfare.
These results suggest that patents are beneﬁcial when, as a result of the need to compete, they spur
R&D and hence innovation. To the extent that disallowing a ﬁrm to use the discovery of others ultimately
forces that ﬁrm to greater investment in R&D the effect of patents is beneﬁcial.
3.1 Investment and Patented Knowledge as Substitutes.
When the (negative) impact of lengthening patent life is greatest on low technology ﬁrms, good technology
may be considered a substitute for the patented technology, and since investment improves technology,
investment becomes a substitute for patented technology. Furthermore, if increasing patent length raises
the marginal product of investment and the marginal value of being a better ﬁrm, then investment also
serves as a substitute for patented information. These assumptions are formalized in the following condi-
tions:
(I-i) Increasing patent life, ℓ, or worsening technology, µ:
(a) impacts lower technology ﬁrms proﬁts more, lowering current proﬁts of better ﬁrms less than
11weaker ﬁrms (in terms of α):15
π(µ
′,α,ℓ
′)−π(µ,α,ℓ), is increasing inα, forℓ
′ ≥ ℓ, µ
′  µ
(b) and worsens the technology draw of weaker ﬁrms more. For g increasing:
Z
g( ˜ α)P(d ˜ α|µ′,α,i,ℓ′)−
Z
g( ˜ α)P(d ˜ α|µ,α,i,ℓ), is increasing inα, forℓ′ ≥ ℓ, µ′  µ









g( ˜ α)∆iP(d ˜ α|µ,α,i,ℓ), forℓ
′ ≥ℓ, µ
′  µ
Thus, increased ambient technology or less access to protected technology raises the marginal pro-
ductivity of investment.
Figure 2 illustrates these assumptions (Since α is not a real number, “α” denotes an axis of ordered α’s).
For a ﬁrm, the impact of increasing ℓ is to reduce access to patented technology, so the ﬁrm will be
worse off. Assumption (I−i(a)) requires that the impact is less for ﬁrms with better technologies. Similarly,
if the ambient aggregate distributions are worse, the effect is greater on weaker ﬁrms. Informally, limited
access to technology or poorer aggregate technology impacts weaker ﬁrms more negatively. Assumption
(I−i(b)) likewise assumes that better ﬁrms are more advantaged in these terms in the technology draw.
So, for example, increasing patent length has a more detrimental effect on lower quality ﬁrm’s in terms
of success in drawing a new technology. Assumption (I−ii) describes how the marginal productivity of
investment for all ﬁrms is impacted by changes in patent life or prevailing technology. If the ambient
technology improves (comparing µ′ and µ), this has synergies with a ﬁrm’s investment and raises the
marginal productivity of investment. Similarly, the marginal productivity of investment is raised when
access to existing technologies is withdrawn by a increasing of patent length.
To repeat, (I-i(a)) implies that the loss of technologies excluded by patents has a greater negative
impact on weak or low technology ﬁrms. While increasing patent life worsens lowers every ﬁrm’s produc-
tivity, according to I-i(b) the impact is less for better technology ﬁrms. Together, these conditions imply
that there is greater pressure on weak ﬁrms to improve in terms of proﬁtability; and there is greater pay-
back to investment after improvement. Condition (I-ii) implies that reducing the access of any ﬁrm, α, to
patented technology, raises the marginal productivity of investment by α.
When increases in patent life affects good ﬁrms less than bad ﬁrms and when increased length of patent
protection raises the marginal value of investment then increased patent protection raises welfare as a
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Figure 2: PATENTED KNOWLEDGE SUBSTITUTABLE FOR TECHNOLOGY AND INVESTMENT
result of raising investment. These observations are summarized in the next theorem.16
Theorem 2 Suppose that proﬁt increases with technology improvement and assumptions (I-i)−(I-ii) are
satisﬁed. Then lengthening patent life improves the aggregate distribution of technologies in successive
periods.
Let VS or VS(µ,ℓ) be the welfare surplus in competitive equilibrium (in the substitutes case.) As ℓ varies,
so does the value of surplus, and, when the substitutes condition is satisﬁed, an increase in ℓ leads to an
increase in investment and hence raises welfare, since, from the social welfare perspective, investment is
too low in equilibrium. The curve VS in ﬁgure 5 depicts this case. The next section considers the opposite
case — where knowledge is complementary to innovation and cost reduction.
3.2 Investment and Patented Knowledge as Complements.
The effect of lengthening patent life is to reduce the publicly available technology, and when the impact
of this is greatest on high technology ﬁrms, good technology is complemented by the patented informa-
tion. Furthermore, if increasing patent length reduces the marginal product of investment, then that
information is also a complement to investment.
So, in contrast to the previous assumptions (I-i)−(I-ii), suppose instead that better ﬁrms are more
dependent on patented information to generate current proﬁt and support innovation, so that such infor-
mation is a complement to the quality of a ﬁrms’ technology. Suppose also that increasing patent length
removes from use information which raises the marginal product of investment (such information is com-
plementary to investment). These conditions are formalized next.
(II-i) Increasing patent life, ℓ, or worsening technology, µt:
(a) impacts better technology ﬁrms proﬁts more, lowering current proﬁts of weaker ﬁrms less than
16Proofs are in the appendix.
13stronger ﬁrms (in terms of α):
π(µ′,α,ℓ′)−π(µ,α,ℓ), is decreasing inα, forℓ′ ≥ℓ, µ′  µ
(b) and worsens the technology draw of better ﬁrms more. For g increasing:
Z
g( ˜ α)P(d ˜ α|µ′
t,α,i,ℓ′)−
Z
g( ˜ α)P(d ˜ α|µt,α,i,ℓ), is decreasing inα, forℓ′ ≥ℓ, µ′  µ
(II-ii) Increasing patent life or worsening the aggregate distribution, µ, lowers the marginal productivity
of investment. For g increasing:
Z
˜ α
g( ˜ α)∆iP(d ˜ α|µ′,α,i,ℓ′)≤
Z
˜ α
g( ˜ α)∆iP(d ˜ α|µ,α,i,ℓ), forℓ′ ≥ℓ, µ′  µ
These assumptions are depicted in ﬁgure 3. Assumption (II−i(a)) asserts that better technology ﬁrms
are more negatively impacted by an extension in patent length, and would be more negatively impacted by
a worsening of the aggregate technology. Assumption (II−i(b)) expresses the same features, but in terms
of the impact on innovation of variations in patent length or aggregate distribution quality. Assumption
(II−ii) says that increasing the patent length or lowering the quality of the aggregate distribution raises
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Figure 3: PATENTED KNOWLEDGE COMPLEMENTARY TO TECHNOLOGY AND INVESTMENT
Under these circumstances, lengthening patent life reduces investment.
Theorem 3 Suppose that proﬁt increases with technology improvement and assumptions (II-i)−(II-ii)
are satisﬁed. Then lengthening patent life worsens the aggregate distributions in successive periods.
As in the earlier discussion write VC or VC(µ,ℓ) to denote the surplus in competitive equilibrium (in
the complements case.) In contrast to the substitutes case, here an increase in ℓ leads to a decrease in
investment and hence reduces welfare. The curve VC in ﬁgure 5 depicts this case.
144 Welfare and Efﬁciency.
The previous discussion focused on investment incentives. Here, that discussion is placed in the context
of overall welfare. Assume an environment where in each period there is a measure of consumer and
producer welfare (surplus) which depends on the distribution of characteristics and the patent policy
(length). Let total welfare generated at time t be denoted TS(µt,ℓ) and assume that:
TS(µ′
t,ℓ′)−TS(µt,ℓ) ≥0, µ′
t  µt, ℓ′ ≤ℓ
so that improving technologies or reducing patent protection on existing technologies raises current wel-






where µ′ = (µ, ′), with  ′ determined from  ′( ) =
R
P(  | α,µt,i,ℓ)τt(di ×dα) The effect of improving the
aggregate distributions is to raise demand and lower supply (marginal cost).
Example 4 Consider a demand and supply model represented by Pd(Q,µ) and Ps(Q,µ,ℓ) respec-





[Pd( ˜ Q,µ)−Ps( ˜ Q,µ,ℓ)]d ˜ Q ,
Write CS(µt,ℓ) for consumer welfare at time t and PS(µt,ℓ) for producer welfare.
TS(µt,ℓ)= PS(µt,ℓ)+CS(µt,ℓ)
Total surplus may be decomposed: for the ﬁrm, proﬁt is π(µ,α,ℓ) so total ﬁrm surplus is PS(µt,ℓ) =
R
π(µ,α,ℓ) (dα) and consumer surplus is then T(µ,ℓ)−PS(µ,ℓ). This case is illustrated in ﬁgure 4,
along with the impact of reducing ℓ to ℓ′ or improving µ to µ′. Improving the distribution increases
both supply and demand, reducing ℓ increases technological availability for ﬁrms and raises supply.
In either case the overall effect is positive (as depicted by the crosshatched lines in ﬁgure 4.) ♦
The social welfare optimization problem must respect the same intellectual property rights as in the
individual ﬁrm problem. However, this optimization problem does address the externality issues — with
access to technology restricted according to the patent length, ℓ. (For this reason the function is depicts
as declining in ℓ in ﬁgure 5).







Figure 4: Surplus Variation
4.1 Welfare comparisons
Summarizing the previous discussion, when patented information is a substitute for both technology and
(the need for) investment then increasing patent life reduces access to that information and forces ﬁrms
to greater investment, raising social welfare. In the complementary case, the opposite is true: these











Figure 5: WELFARE AS PATENT LENGTH VARIES
In the substitutes case, increasing patent life raises the value of having good technology (hence encour-
aging investment indirectly), and raises the direct value of investment in improving one’s own technology.
Hence, increasing patent length raises welfare. In contrast, with complements, it is advantageous to have
good technology at the ﬁrm level to beneﬁt from synergies with the available public technology: capital-
17When ℓ is very large, patent protection extends beyond obsolescence and changing ℓ has no impact on societal welfare.
16izing on this synergy encourages investment to improve one’s own technology.18 There, the less available
is public technology, the less beneﬁt from private investment. In addition, in the complements case, the
direct value of investment is lower since the improvement in own technology is lower when publicly avail-
able technology is older. Thus, the beneﬁt of investment is reduced and these effects together imply that
lengthening patent life reduces welfare.
When these effects conﬂict the consequence of increasing patent life is ambiguous. This occurs, for
example, when increasing patent life has greater (negative) impact on better technology ﬁrms but at the
same time increases the marginal productivity of investment (in generating innovation). In this case,
there is less incentive to improve, but it is easier to do so.
Remark 1 One special case of interest is that where the impact of changing patent length on the
marginal productivity is small or 0, so that varying patent length has (essentially) no impact in the
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¤
≈0.
In this case, if increasing patent length has a more adverse effect on weaker (low technology) ﬁrms,
then it is welfare improving; and if the effect is greater on stronger ﬁrms, then it is welfare reducing.
In particular, patent policy plays a beneﬁcial role when it forces less technologically advanced ﬁrms to
invest more (by depriving them of the use of others ideas). So, patents are beneﬁcial not because they
encourage reward seeking behavior, but because to survive a ﬁrm is compelled to invest and innovate:
competitive pressure rather than the prize of monopoly spurs research. ♦
5 Remarks on the Model.
The model developed in this paper is an idealized model with the entire focus on incentive aspects of
access to technology among competitive ﬁrms. This abstracts from a host of issues, currently the subject
of intense discussion. Some of these are discussed next, in section (5.1).
The assumptions appearing in the “substitutes” and “complements” cases identify two sets of circum-
stances under which the impact of patent length variation on investment can be determined. There are
many other possibilities, when one or more of the conditions fail in either case. In such circumstances,
the impact of varying patent length on investment is ambiguous since it creates competing inﬂuences on
a ﬁrm’s decision to invest.
18In the ﬁgures, when ℓ becomes large, the patent is protecting old and obsolete technology so there is no welfare impact.
175.1 Other Issues
The framework here assumes a speciﬁc market structure (large numbers of agents) and competitive ﬁrm
behavior. However, in reality there are only a ﬁnite number of ﬁrms, and in practice a small number
may exercise substantial power.19 This concentration of “patent power” in the hands of small numbers of
ﬁrms alters dramatically the impact of patents on welfare. With small numbers of ﬁrms dominant in each
ﬁeld, often with a large fringe of small or marginal ﬁrms, the environment is more typical of competition
between small numbers of ﬁrms providing differentiated products and having overlapping patent rights,
so that competition is both at the level of the produce and at the level of technology holdings in terms of
patents.
Apart from the incentive to invest, the existence of patent rights creates a host of other strategic incen-
tives, unintended or unanticipated in the abstract conception of the role of a patent. Along with legitimate
incentives to innovate, incentives exist for individuals or companies to abuse the system in a variety of
ways: for example, by seeking patents for ideas already know and for trivial blocking inventions which
may then be used to obtain unearned rents from other ﬁrms. Historically, the nature of patentable dis-
covery was narrowly circumscribed, limiting scope for abuse, but in recent years the range of patentable
innovation has been dramatically expanded, covering business methods, communication protocols, medi-
cal procedures and so on. As a result, the rate at which patents are granted has increased dramatically,
generating a complex web of intellectual property ownership. This in turn has intensiﬁed a variety of
issues in the use of patents as strategic tools in competition. Examples are plentiful. When an application
makes use of a variety of patents (such as in video compression or communications protocols), individual
patent holders can exert holdup-power. Or, when a patent is complex and it’s contribution difﬁcult to
determine, an undeserving patentee may use the court system to extract rents via the threat of lengthy
litigation. A patent can be used to impede competition. A patent may be obtained in anticipation of
inventions by others from which the patentee can then extract unearned rent; and so on. Or a patent
may be obtained for defensive purposes — to assert ownership of ideas in case of a legal challenge, or to
have tradeable patents usable a bargaining chips. All these concerns are exacerbated by the fact that a
dramatic increase in the volume of applications makes it more difﬁcult to assess the merit of each patent
application raising the variability in the quality of the screening process and the true merit of patents
granted. The study of such issues is complex, each particular issue requiring individual analysis. See [7],
for example, for a discussion of a range of current problems facing the patent system. Finally, in many
environments it is difﬁcult to unravel competing ownership rights and so the legal rights of the patentee
may be clouded, or there may be multiple entities with rights to various components of a program or im-
plementation of an idea. In such circumstances, the detailed operation of the patent ofﬁce and the court
19Apple, IBM, Microsoft and a handful of ﬁrms are dominant patent holders in the ﬁeld of computer technology; in cellular phone
service a small number of ﬁrms are dominant; in video technology the MPEG LA consortium consists of the major patent holders of
video compression technology, and so on.
18system is central to any attempt to disentangle rights and claims.
While such problems may hinder the functioning of the patent system or reduce the beneﬁt provided by
the system, the basic presumption remains that the patent system, “warts and all”, promotes innovation
and increases social welfare in the long run. From this perspective, the basic principle is sound, and
therefore examination of the performance of the system should focus on improvement and “ﬁne-tuning”. In
practice this has proved difﬁcult. In 2002, the European Commission issued a directive (“Directive on the
Patentability of Computer Implemented Inventions”, with the intent of providing a standard for software
patents across Europe. However, the proposals were ultimately rejected by the European Parliament after
a protracted struggle over the content of the proposal. With a view to re-evaluation of the USPTO patent
policy, the FTC prepared a detailed report on patent policy in 200320. Concern over patent granting in the
United States led Congress to introduce a bill21 in July 2005 with the intent of improving patent quality
and restricting “legal gamesmanship”; the Senate introduced a bill in 2006 also with the aim of reforming
the patent system. Eventually a patent act22 was passed by both House and Senate in 2011. Among the
main new features are the switch from a ﬁrst-to-invent to ﬁrst-to-ﬁle system, a post patent-grant review
system and a study (through the General Accounting Ofﬁce) of patent litigation by non-practicing entities
and the impact of such entities on the overall functioning of the system. The basic premise is that with
greater care in the Patent Ofﬁce and a more ﬁnely tuned judiciary handling patents, standards will be
corrected and enforced.
6 Conclusion
The traditional argument for patents is that they encourage innovation by giving the innovator monopoly
power for a period of time: monopoly rights create the incentive to invest so that innovation in the aggre-
gate is greater that it would be in the absence of patents. In the environment here, individual innovations
are important to the ﬁrm but alone not signiﬁcant in the overall pool of discovery from period to period.
The synergy from the pooling of innovation is what creates the externality value in discovery. But the
patent blocks the innovator from beneﬁting from that pool of discovery. While the patent system cannot
achieve an efﬁcient outcome for the market — because some of the positive externalities cannot be in-
ternalized, this blocking effect can have either a positive or a negative impact on overall innovation and
welfare. Whether patents improve or worsen overall welfare depends on the exact way in which innovation
interacts with investment and ﬁrm quality (as discussed in sections (3.1) and (3.2)).
This discussion focuses entirely on the incentive effects that arise from obtaining monopoly rights on
innovation when there are large numbers of innovators. In particular, the prospect of licensing is not
20To Promote Innovation: The Proper Balance of Competition and Patent Law and Policy, Report by the FTC, October 2003.
21Patent Reform Act of 2005, HR 2795.
22The Leahy-Smith America Invents Act.
19considered. One might argue that somehow the positive externalities might be internalized by the ﬁrms
in the market. However, as mentioned earlier, there are good reasons to expect that this might not happen.
Large numbers of innovators make reaching consensus on sharing of innovation difﬁcult, but beyond this,
the overlap in discovery in any period and the dependent evolution of discovery over time make it difﬁcult
if not impossible to price individual innovations and hence allocate value to ideas. So, while the possibility
exists that a market might develop to price each innovator’s discoveries, it is questionable as to whether
or not this would occur.
20Appendix: Orderings and Technology Evolution
Ordering on Technology
A is an ordered topological space where the relation   is reﬂexive (α   α), transitive (α   α′ and α′   α′′
imply α   α′′), and antisymmetric (α   α′ and α′   α imply α = α′). (For example: A = {α | α : [a,b] →
ℜ, αmeasurable} where α′   α if α′(x)≥α(x),x ∈[a,b].) If technology were characterized by a real number,
the ﬁrm with the largest α would be the best ﬁrm, unequivocally, eliminating the possibility for different
ﬁrms to have area speciﬁc strengths.
Ordering on Distributions over Technology
For the following review, take as given: (a1) Λ, a completely regular topological space (for example, Λ a
metric space), (a2) BΛ the Borel ﬁeld on Λ, (b)  , an order on Λ (reﬂexive, transitive and antisymmetric),
(c) Cb(Λ), the set of continuous bounded real-valued functions on Λ, (d) M+(Λ), the set of non-negative
measures on Λ, and (e) P (Λ) the set of probability measures on Λ. (A topological space Λ is completely
regular if and only if when A is closed in Λ and α ∈ A, there is a continuous function, f, f :Λ→[0,1] such
that f(α)=0 and f(A)=1.)
Deﬁnition 2 A real valued function f :Λ → ℜ is called increasing if α′   α implies that f(α′) ≥ f(α) (and
decreasing if α′   α implies that f(α′) ≤ f(α)). Write Im(Λ) for the set of increasing measurable functions
on Λ.
A set B⊆Λ is called increasing if x,y ∈Λ, x ∈ B and y  x imply that y∈ B.
Deﬁnition 3 Given  ,ν ∈P (Λ), deﬁne a pre-ordering (reﬂexive and transitive relation) on P (Λ):





The natural generalization of a result on dominance in ℜ is (see Torres [15]):
Theorem 5   ν if and only if  (A)≥ν(A) for every increasing measurable set A.
The Evolution of Technology
The distribution  t+1( ) depends on µt, ℓ and τt. This may be made explicit by writing:





P( |µt,αt,it,ℓ)τt(dit ×dαt), τt ∈M(I×A), (9)
where τt ∈ C ( t) and ψ is the function determining the one-period ahead distribution over technologies.
With µt+1 =(µt, t+1), and τt+1 ∈C ( t+1),  t+2( )=ψ( |µt+1,τt+1,ℓ), and so on.
21If we ﬁx a sequence of strategies τt = {τt+j}j≥0, given  t, we may determine the sequence of distribu-
tions:
ψ1( | t,τt,ℓ) = ψ( |µt,τt,ℓ)
ψ2( | t,τt,ℓ) = ψ( |(µt,ψ1( | t,τt,ℓ)),τt+1,ℓ)
ψ3( | t,τt,ℓ) = ψ( |(µt,ψ1( | t,τt,ℓ),ψ2( | t,τt,ℓ)),τt+2,ℓ)
. . . =
. . .
ψj( | t,τt,ℓ) = ψ( |(µt,ψ1,ψ2,...,ψj),τt+j,ℓ)
Given µt and τt, the history is determined in t+ j as (µt,ψ1,...,ψj). Then proﬁt to α in period t+ j is
π((µt,ψ1,...,ψj),α,ℓ) and the conditional distribution P(  | (µt,ψ1,...,ψj),α,i,ℓ). When j > ℓ, variations
in ℓ affect both the innovations in the public domain (from periods prior to t+ j −ℓ and the current






In this formulation, a variation in ℓ at time t impacts both the length of time for which patented dis-
covery stays out of the public domain, but also impacts the aggregate distributions from period t onward,
through the updating rule ψj, with the aggregate distributions, {τt+j} ﬁxed.
22Appendix: Proofs
The ﬁrst lemma, lemma 1, conﬁrms that the monotonicity of π in µ carries over to the value function.
Lemma 1 v(µt,τt,α,ℓ) is increasing in µt: if ¯ µt = (..., ¯  t−1, ¯  t) dominates ˆ µt = (..., ˆ  t−1, ˆ  t) component-
wise, then v( ¯ µt,τt,α,ℓ) ≥ v( ˆ µt,τt,α,ℓ) for all α.
Proof: Since π( ¯ µt,α,ℓ) ≥ π( ˆ µt,α,ℓ) from (I−i(a)) and P(d ˜ α | ¯ µt,α,i,ℓ)   P(d ˜ α | ˆ µt,α,i,ℓ) for each t, the
result follows directly.
When patent length, ℓ, varies then apart from the direct effect on the payoff function and the transition
kernel, there is the indirect effect of varying future distributions which impact the proﬁt in those subse-
quent periods. Considering proﬁt k periods on after the increasing of patent length in period t, the follow-
ing calculations show that proﬁt increases with ℓ, given any ﬁxed sequence of strategies τt ={τt+j}j≥0.
Lemma 2 For all k,
∂π(( t,ψ1,...,ψk),α,ℓ)
∂ℓ
is increasing in α.
Proof: Let ψ1,...,ψk be the distribution sequence determined by ℓ and ψ′
1,...,ψ′
k the sequence deter-





























































g( ˜ α)P(d ˜ α|µt,ψk,α,i,ℓ)
is increasing in α.
Proof: With ℓ′ ≥ ℓ,
Z
g( ˜ α)P(d ˜ α|µt,ψ′k,α,i,ℓ′)−
Z
g( ˜ α)P(d ˜ α|µt,ψk,α,i,ℓ) =
[
Z








g( ˜ α)P(d ˜ α|µt,ψ′k,α,i,ℓ)−
Z
g( ˜ α)P(d ˜ α|µt,ψk,α,i,ℓ)]
where ψk =(ψ1,ψ2,...,ψk). So, as before, using I−i(b), and with α∗  α,
Z









g( ˜ α)P(d ˜ α|µt,ψ′k,α,i,ℓ′)−
Z
g( ˜ α)P(d ˜ α|µt,ψk,α,i,ℓ)
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π(µt,ψ1, ˜ α,ℓ)P(d ˜ α|µt,α,it,ℓ)}































[P(d ˜ α|µt,α′,it,ℓ)−P(d ˜ α|µt,α,it,ℓ)]+
δ
Z
π(µt,ψ1, ˜ α,ℓ)[∆ℓP(d ˜ α|µt,α′,it,ℓ)−∆ℓP(d ˜ α|µt,α,it,ℓ)]
Considering the three terms on the right, the ﬁrst term is positive since since πℓ is increasing in α,
using (I−i(a)); the second term is positive since P(d ˜ α | µt,α′,it,ℓ)   P(d ˜ α | µt,α,it,ℓ). Finally, from
(I −i(b)) the third term is positive — since π(µt+1,α,ℓ) is increasing in α and ∆ℓP(d ˜ α | µt,α′,it,ℓ) ﬁrst
order stochastically dominates ∆ℓP(d ˜ α|µt,α,it,ℓ)]. Hence,
∂v2(µt,τt,α,ℓ)
∂ℓ is increasing in α.
For notational convenience, observe that the k period valuation function, vk(µt,τt,α,ℓ) may be ex-
pressed in terms of ψ1,ψ2,...,ψk, the aggregate distribution in each of the k periods from t, determined
by τt: vk(µt,ψ1,...,ψk,α,ℓ). Write vk
ℓ(µt,ψ1,...,ψk,α,ℓ) for the partial derivative with respect to ℓ.
Also, for convenience, let (ψ1,...,ψk)=ψk.
Suppose that vk














vk(µt,ψk, ˜ α,ℓ)∆ℓP(d ˜ α|µt,ψk,α,it,ℓ)
Thus, for any k, and (µt,τt,ℓ), vk
ℓ(µt,τt,α,ℓ) is increasing in α.






Passing to the limit,
v(µt,τt,α′,ℓ′)−v(µt,τt,α′,ℓ) ≥ v(µt,τt,α,ℓ′)−v(µt,τt,α,ℓ)
25Dividing by ℓ′−ℓ and taking limits (ℓ′ →ℓ) gives:
∂v(µt,τt,α,ℓ)
∂ℓ
is increasing in α.




v(µt+1,τt+1,α,ℓ)∆iP(d ˜ α|µt,α,i,ℓ) ≡0
the marginal impact of a variation in ℓ on ﬁrm α’s investment level, ignoring the impact on the equilibrium


























˜ αvℓ(µt+1,τt+1,α,ℓ)∆iP(d ˜ α|µt,α,i,ℓ)+δ
R
˜ αv(µt+1,τt+1,α,ℓ)∆liP(d ˜ α|µt,α,i,ℓ)
r′′(it)−δ
R
˜ αv(µt+1,τt+1,α,ℓ)∆iiP(d ˜ α|µt,α,i,ℓ)
(11)
From the second order condition, the denominator is positive, so the sign of
dit
dℓ is the same as that of the
numerator. Since v is increasing in α and ∆iP( ˜ α|µt,α,i,ℓ′) ∆iP( ˜ α|µt,α,i,ℓ) for ℓ′ ≥ ℓ, from assumption
(I−iii),
R
˜ αv(µt,τt,α,ℓ)∆liP( ˜ α | µt,α,i,ℓ) > 0. From lemma 4, vℓ(µt,τt,α,ℓ) is increasing in α so that
R
˜ αvℓ(µ(t), ˜ α,ℓ,t)∆iP( ˜ α|µt,α,i,ℓ) >0, for each t. Consequently,
dit
dℓ >0.
This expression gives the variation in ﬁrm α’s investment level that would result if ℓ were increased,
and the actions of the population, (τt,τt+1), held constant. However, increased investment resulting from
an increase in ℓ occurs for all agents, alters future aggregate distributions, and alters optimal decisions
in future periods.
These calculations ignore the impact of changes in investment behavior on the aggregate distribution.










v(µt+1,τt+1, ˜ α,ℓ′)∆iP(d ˜ α|µt,α,i′,ℓ′).
has solution i′ > i. However, τt+1 cannot now be an equilibrium strategy as higher investment by each
ﬁrm will impact  t+j, j ≥ 1, raising the quality of the aggregate distribution in the next and subsequent
26periods. From lemma (1) and (I − ii),
R
˜ αv(µt+1,τt+1, ˜ α,ℓ′)∆iP(d ˜ α | µt,α,i′,ℓ′) increases so that the best
response from α is to raise i further with consequent (further) impact on the aggregate distribution.
Assuming r′(x) is sufﬁciently large for large values of x, the iterative process will eventually converge
to equilibrium. Consequently the impact of increasing ℓ is to raise the aggregate distribution quality in
subsequent periods and hence the present value of surplus (welfare).
Proof of theorem 3: Assumption (II −ii) implies that
R
˜ αv(µ(t), ˜ α,ℓ)∆liP( ˜ α |µt,α,i,ℓ) < 0 and (II −i(a))
implies that
R
˜ αvℓ(µ(t), ˜ α,ℓ)∆iP( ˜ α|µt,α,i,ℓ) <0. Consequently,
dit
dℓ <0.
As before, these calculations ignore the impact of changes in investment behavior on the aggregate









v(µt+1,τt+1, ˜ α,ℓ′)∆iP(d ˜ α|µt,α,i′,ℓ′).
Again, this expression ignores the fact that lower investment will impact the future distributions: τt+1
cannot now be an equilibrium strategy as lower investment by each ﬁrm will impact  t+j, j ≥1, reducing
the quality of the aggregate distribution in the next and subsequent periods.
From lemma (1) and (II − ii),
R
˜ αv(µt+1,τt+1, ˜ α,ℓ′)∆iP(d ˜ α | µt,α,i′,ℓ′) decreases so that the best re-
sponse from α is to reduce i further with consequent (further) impact on the aggregate distribution. As-
suming r′(x)→0 as x →0, the iterative process will eventually converge to equilibrium. Consequently the
impact of increasing ℓ is to worsen the aggregate distribution quality in subsequent periods and hence the
present value of surplus (welfare).
 






where µ′ = (µ,ψ1) and where ψ1 depends on τ (where necessary, this may be made explicit by writing
ψ1(τ)). The following discussion shows that
V(µ′,ℓ′)−V(µ,ℓ)≥0, µ′  µ, ℓ′ ≤ℓ (13)
so that, in particular, V is decreasing in ℓ.






Suppose that for some n>1, Vn−1 satisﬁes (14), then Vn satisﬁes (13). Vn(µ,ℓ)=Vn−1(µ,ℓ). To see this, let
τn solve (14), and consider a variation in ℓ to ℓ′ < ℓ. With τn ﬁxed, apart from direct impact, ψ1 shifts to
ψ′
1  ψ1, so that Vn−1((µ,ψ′












Similar computations give a comparable result for µ variation: Vn(µ′,ℓ) ≥ Vn(µ,ℓ), µ′   µ. Thus, if Vn−1
satisﬁes (13), so does Vn. Since V1 satisﬁes (13), Vn also does for each n, and taking the limit as n → ∞,
gives the property for V. In particular, this implies that V is decreasing in ℓ.
An alternative proof can be give as follows. The optimization problem may be expressed in slightly
different terms. Let:
C ∗( )={τ=(τ1,τ2,...)|margΛτt = t,  1 =  ,  t+1 =
Z
P( |µt,αt,it,ℓ)τt(dit ×dαt), t≥1}
giving thosesequences (τ1,τ2,...) of feasible strategies — consistent with the initial aggregate distribution.








where  t, t+1, and so on are determined according to equation (3).
Given any τt, let {µt+j(τt,ℓ)}∞
j=0 be the resulting sequence of technology distributions. Increasing ℓ
lowers the sequence pointwise (in stochastic dominance terms), for all t, so that T(µt,ℓ) falls for each t.
Hence the maximum over τt is lower as ℓ increases.
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